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Abstract 
 
The objective of this research project is to analyze the demographic 
characteristics of voters in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Ohio in order to 
determine if there are significant differences between primary, caucus, 
and general electorates and to investigate the consequences of these 
differences for election outcomes.  Using a multinomial logit model to 
estimate vote share predictions for presidential candidates, I find that 
although the two voting populations may be ideologically and 
demographically distinct, their final presidential candidate choices are 
not substantially different.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Researching presidential primaries and caucuses raises many interesting debates and 
discussions, particularly regarding the representativeness of primary and caucus electorates in 
comparison with the general electorate.  This paper examines these three voting populations and 
their demographic characteristics, with a specific focus on: gender, race, age, ideology, and 
educational attainment.   Ultimately, it seeks to answer whether primary and caucus electoral 
outcomes be different if the electorates were more demographically similar to co-partisans who 
vote in the general election. 
Since the McGovern Fraser Commission’s reform of the nomination process and the 
subsequent proliferation of primary elections, much discussion has been given to the potential 
misrepresentation of the American general electorate in the new nominating system whose aim 
was to “democratize” the candidate selection process.  Are primary voters fundamentally distinct 
from general election voters?  What characteristics define the composition of these electorates?  
How does the population of caucus voters compare to the population of primary voters?  What 
are the consequences of these differences for the candidates who ultimately secure their party’s 
nomination?  These questions can provide important insights into the American electoral system 
and the institution of the presidency, and their solutions begin with answering the question posed 
by this study.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A unique feature of American politics is the office of the presidency.  While the 
legislative and judicial branch are armed with checks and balances to inhibit the power of the 
executive branch and ensure that its power does not grow to dictatorial heights, it is still arguably 
the most powerful office in the country (Flaherty 1996). Indeed, many scholars have remarked 
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on the critical importance of the highest position in the American government:  “In the twentieth 
century, the American presidency became the single most powerful political institution in the 
United States” (Donovan and Bowler 2004, 102).  Given the vast importance of this position, it 
is logical that the office of the American presidency is a subject that has been given much debate.  
A large subset of this scholarly discussion revolves around presidential elections – 
understandably, as this method of popular vote determines whom the individual that will occupy 
the nation’s most prestigious and powerful political position will be.  Arguably as important as 
the general election are presidential primaries and caucuses, as these preliminary races narrow 
the sometimes-broad field of candidates to one for each major party. 
 The system of primaries and caucuses present in American politics today bears little 
resemblance to the process that existed prior to the McGovern Fraser Commission of 1968.   
This commission released its official report, Mandate for Reform, in response to the tumultuous 
Democratic National Convention of 1968.  Judith Center explains the unrepresentative nature of 
the convention delegates prior to the reform commission: 
Certainly the demographic composition of the 1968 Democratic National Convention 
appeared to reinforce the traditional image of national convention delegates as a 
convocation of middle-aged, white, upper-income males.  Mandate for Reform noted that 
at the 1968 convention, sixteen state delegations contained no voting members under the 
age of thirty, and thirteen others had only one delegate from that age group.  Eight states 
claimed an average delegate age of over fifty years.  According to the commission report, 
only 5.5% of the 1968 delegates were black […] Median income was over $15,000 and 
only 13% of the voting delegates were women. (Center 326) 
 
The unrepresentative character of the delegates was not the only concern that precipitated the 
formation of the McGovern Fraser Commission and its subsequent reforms.  The Democratic 
Party’s choice of Hubert Humphrey as its presidential nominee, despite the fact that he had not 
entered a single primary race, highlighted and intensified citizens’ beliefs that the nomination 
process was too far removed from public opinion, causing demonstrations and violent police 
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response outside of the Chicago convention hall (Kaufmann 2003).  Thus, the 28-member 
commission with Senator George McGovern at its head (and later Representative Donald M. 
Fraser, when McGovern announced his presidential ambitions) was formed.   
 Although this commission was established with the intention of “[giving the Democratic 
party] an excellent opportunity to reform its ways and to prepare for the problems of a new 
decade,” it had issues with representativeness as well (Kaufmann 2003):  “The McGovern 
Commission was the body most directly concerned with developing, issuing, and implementing 
the rules that would govern the processes of delegate selection for the 1972 convention.  
Although one might think that a group assuming such broad-ranging responsibility should reflect 
fairly the diverse major interests of the party constituency […] the commission was top-heavy 
with liberals, reformers, and grass-roots political activists” (Center 328).  Regardless of the 
potentially uncharacteristic composition of the McGovern Fraser Commission, Mandate for 
Reform presented several directives, as well as recommendations, for reform measures to ensure 
more power in the hands of the American citizen:   
[The McGovern Fraser Commission’s report] removed control over nominations from 
state and national party elites and placed this power squarely in the hands of the voting 
public.  These […] invalidated all state convention, primary, and caucus procedures with 
two acceptable methods of delegate selection – the party primary and the open caucus. 
(Kaufmann 2003, 462) 
 
These reforms drastically changed the reform process from one largely controlled by party elites 
to one that was far more influenced by the popular electorate; however, this change had an 
unintended ramification:  the proliferation of state primary elections as a means of candidate 
selection (Kaufmann 2003. 470).  “A dramatic increase in state primaries resulted [from the 
reforms], from 16 [primaries] choosing 38% of the delegates in 1968 to 23 choosing over 60% in 
1972 to 30 state primaries choosing 72.6% in 1976.  In 2008, 37 states plus the District of 
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Columbia […] held some sort of primary, while the remaining states used caucuses and 
conventions to select their delegates, or some combination of both” (Tolbert 2009, 8).  The 
Republican Party soon replicated these reforms, and, unsurprisingly, a rapid increase in GOP 
primaries echoed the development of the institution in the Democratic Party.  
 Presidential primary elections can occur in two different ways – through open or closed 
races:  “In a closed primary, voters may vote only in the primary of the political party in which 
they are registered.  For example, a voter who registered as a Republican can only vote in the 
Republican primary” (Longley 4).  In an open primary, the electorate is allowed to vote in either 
party’s primary.  Several states also boast modified-open or modified-closed primaries, the 
regulations of which differ from state to state (Longley 5).   In some states, delegates are pledged 
to the victor of the primary election, while in others some or all delegates are unpledged, free to 
vote for any candidate at the party convention.  Caucuses, the less popular of the two institutions, 
differ from primaries:   
Caucuses are simply meetings, open to all registered voters of the party, at which 
delegates to the party’s national convention are selected.   When the caucus begins, the 
voters in attendance divide themselves into groups according to the candidate they 
support.  The undecided voters congregate in their own group and prepare to be ‘courted’ 
by supporters of other candidates.  Voters in each group are then invited to give speeches 
supporting their candidate and trying to persuade others to join their group.  At the end of 
the caucus, party organizers count the voters in each candidate’s group and calculate how 
many delegates to the […] convention each candidate has won. (Longley 7) 
 
Despite the vast difference in regulations governing primaries and caucuses, caucus delegates 
may be pledged or unpledged, as in primaries, depending on the party rules of each state.  Each 
method of preliminary presidential candidate selection boasts its own advantages and 
disadvantages.  While primaries have lower political costs to attend and therefore foster higher 
turnout rates, caucus races have the advantage of “identifying potential activists and volunteers, 
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permitting grass-roots issue debate, and allowing face-to-face meetings of party activists” 
(Marshall 180).    
 As post-McGovern Fraser reforms have given way to the norm of primaries and caucuses 
as a means for presidential candidate selection, the scholarly debate regarding elections has 
experienced a parallel increase.  One particularly contentious issue that has fostered substantial 
discussion is the question of primary and caucus representativeness. This issue is extremely 
important to the study of political science, as the convention process being unrepresentative was 
the initial spark that galvanized the formation of the McGovern Fraser Commission.  This sphere 
of scholarly dialogue has been discussed extensively, and many different conclusions have been 
drawn with regard to whether primary and caucus methods are democratic, and the potential 
ramifications of the possibility that they are not.  This debate was initiated by V.O. Key, who 
expressed concerns that “the effective primary constituency […] may come to consist 
predominantly of the people of certain sections of a state, of persons of specific national origin or 
religious affiliation, of people especially responsive to certain styles of political leadership or 
shades of ideology, or of groups markedly unrepresentative in one way or another of the party 
following” (Key 1956, 167).  This thesis has obvious potential ramifications to the American 
political system and the office of the presidency – if primary voters are fundamentally dissimilar 
from general election voters, are the Democratic and Republican Parties’ candidates and the 
subsequent presidential elections truly representative of the popular vote?   
 Owing to the contentious and disputed nature of this debate, many scholars have come to 
different conclusions regarding Key’s initial findings.  Moore and Hofsetter find that there are 
substantial differences between the populations of primary and general election voters by 
analyzing self-reported voter rates in Columbus, Ohio:  
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[In this study] some significant differences [in primary voters] were found in the 
Democratic Party, a result that differs somewhat […] from [other] studies […] This study 
[…] suggests two hypotheses:  first, that misrepresentation by voters or nonvoters in 
primary elections is more likely to occur in highly issue-oriented and tightly contested 
elections than in elections of low issue and candidate stimulus; and second, that subjects’ 
responses about whether or not they have voted in the primary election may be distorted 
both by the low salience of the election and the perceived desirability of voting. (Moore 
and Hofsetter 1973) 
 
Moore and Hofsetter find that there are significant differences in the two populations, allowing 
the prospect of misrepresentation to occur.  Interestingly, the authors found through checking 
voting records that thirty percent of those who reported voting actually did not.  When this 
reality was accounted for, the differences between the populations were magnified even further 
(Moore and Hofsetter 1973).   
In the article “1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy,” Center 
further questions the legitimacy of the current system of primaries and caucuses because of its 
roots in the McGovern Fraser Commission.  According to Center, the Commission’s composition 
of “liberals, reformers, and grass-roots political activists” in the Democratic Party created a 
method of candidate selection that is inherently unrepresentative. Because the proliferation of 
primaries and caucuses grew from the recommendations of an uncharacteristic elite, Center 
posits, the current system innately misrepresents the rank-and-file members of the Democratic 
and Republican Parties (Center 1974).   
 Another point raised by several scholars deals with the regulations governing the 
structure of the primary system.  As previously discussed, open primaries allow registered voters 
to cast a ballot in the primary election of either party, while closed primaries require the 
electorate to vote only in the primary of the political party in which they are registered (Longley 
4).  There has been much speculation as to how the composition of a closed primary electorate 
differs from that of an open primary.  Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman examine the extent to 
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which open and modified-open primaries attract a more representative electorate than do closed 
primaries.  The authors find that an open primary system draws a more “typical” voter than does 
a closed primary:  “Controlling for election-specific events as well as the competitiveness and 
timing of individual primaries, we indeed find evidence that reformed primary structures 
influence the composition of the electorate. […] Open and modified-open primaries attract more 
ideologically centrist and more demographically representative primary electorates” (Kaufmann 
et al. 2003, 472).  The authors contend that through the adoption of the open or modified-open 
primary structure, Democratic primaries yield candidates less liberal than the party following and 
Republican primaries supply candidates that are less ideologically conservative than their party 
base (Kaufmann et al. 2003). The conclusions of Gerber and Morton further solidify the research 
of Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman: “[In] more closed primary systems, control over candidate 
nominations by ideological extremists will translate into a higher likelihood that extreme 
candidates win in the general election […] [In] more open systems, participation by a wider 
spectrum of the electorate means that candidates must appeal to more moderate voters, leading to 
the election of more moderate candidates” (Gerber and Morton 1998, 304).  The findings of 
these two studies have important implications for the study of presidential primaries and 
caucuses – if conventional wisdom claiming that primary voters are generally more ideologically 
extreme than general election voters is correct, then states with closed primary systems of 
candidate selection may foster the selection of presidential candidates that are not representative 
of general election voters or the country’s larger population.  
 John G. Geer’s “Assessing the Representativeness of Electorates in Presidential 
Primaries” further analyzes the issue of primaries allowing the selection of candidates that 
misrepresent the general electorate, finding mixed results.  By comparing the demographics and 
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ideologies of those who voted in a party’s primary with the party’s identifiers and independents 
who voted for the party’s candidate in the general election (what Geer labels “the party 
following), Geer concludes that  the “widely held [belief] […] that electorates in presidential 
primaries are better paid, better educated, and more ideologically extreme than the party 
following, […] the biases are small enough to have few consequences when selecting 
candidates” (Geer 1988, 929).  Thus, although Geer did find substantial differences between the 
primary and general electorates, the divergences he argued  were negligible and would have only  
a very small impact on the ultimate candidate choices of the primary electorate (Geer 1988).1    
 While many scholars have posited that there is ample (or mixed) evidence that the 
primary electorate is ideologically and demographically distinct from the general electorate, 
there is a substantial amount of research suggesting that primary and caucus voters are not 
noticeably dissimilar from their counterparts in general elections.   Comparing the self-reported 
ideology and the issue positions of primary and general election voters on the 1980 National 
Election Study, Norrander finds this to be true in her analysis of presidential primary voters:  
Concerns over the representativeness of the primary electorate arise because the nature of 
the electorate could influence the selection of presidential candidates.  Fears about 
extremist primary voters selecting extremist candidates unpalatable to the more moderate 
general election voters are unsupported.  Primary voters are just not more ideologically 
extreme. (Norrander 1989, 570) 
 
Norrander finds that, contrary to previous research and the original thesis of V.O. Key, primary 
voters are not ideologically unrepresentative “and, at most, differ slightly on ideological 
sophistication and identification,” although this does not lead to the selection of vastly different 
presidential candidates from the Democratic or Republican primaries (1989, 525).    
                                                        
1 For example, Geer’s analysis of data from 1976 and 1980 concludes that ideological moderates are 
surprisingly overrepresented in primary electorates.  This would actually diminish the prospects that 
primaries are promoting ideologically extreme candidates that are too far to the right or left for the general 
electorate.  
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Nownes offers further support for this idea in his article “Primaries, General Elections, 
and Voter Turnout:  A Multinomial Logit Model of the Decision to Vote.”  Using data from the 
1988 National Election Study, Nownes modeled the dynamics that led voters to vote on both the 
primary and the general election, only in the general election, or in neither the primary nor the 
general.  He finds that “[there] is no evidence […] that primary voters are more efficacious, 
‘dutiful,’ concerned about the election outcome, or informed, than other voters.  In short, 
individuals who vote in both [primary and general] elections are not much different than 
individuals who vote only in the general election.  Both sets of voters share many of the same 
characteristics” (Nownes 1992, 219).  These findings call into question other studies concluding 
that primary voters are vastly ideologically and demographically distinct from the general 
electorate.  
 Further support for the conclusion that these two electorates are similar can be found 
from several state-specific studies using data from the early post-reform era in the 1970s. 
Contrary to Key’s finding that “the effective primary constituency may often be a caricature of 
the entire party following,” DiNitto and Smithers find in their analysis that there are few 
differences between primary and general election voters (Key 1956; DiNitto and Smithers 1972).  
Researching the results of a survey study of the Democratic gubernatorial, senatorial, and 
congressional primaries and general elections held in New York, the authors claim that there are 
not great differences between primary and general electorates (DiNitto and Smithers 1972).  
Further calling into question the claim that these populations vary is the work of Ranney (1968; 
with Epstein 1966).  Looking at voters in Wisconsin, Ranney finds that with regard to issue 
positions and candidate preferences, primary voters are “not significantly unrepresentative” 
(1968, 224).  Ranney and Epstein found in 1966 that strong partisan identifiers were no more 
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likely to vote than weaker identifiers in primary elections.  These articles posit that primary 
electorates are not remarkably different from voters in the general election; this conclusion 
carries the implication that primary voters will therefore not, as other research suggests, elect 
candidates that are extreme or that misrepresent the will of the general public.    
 Another facet of the scholarly debate surrounding presidential candidate selection 
includes discussion of primaries and caucuses, and whether the populations voting in these two 
types of elections are fundamentally different.  If evidence suggests that these electorates are, in 
fact, unalike, then the conclusion would have obvious implications for presidential candidate 
selection and American politics: 
The low turnout characteristic of caucus and convention systems aggravates fears of 
serious misrepresentation.  For example, in 1972, turnout in the presidential delegate-
selecting caucuses averaged about six percent of eligible Democrats.  Past political 
research has suggested that low turnout is particularly likely to involve misrepresentation.  
(Marshall 1978, 170) 
 
Because of the time-consuming process involved in participating in a presidential caucus (as 
opposed to a simple ballot cast in a primary election), caucuses have much lower turnout:  “A 
caucus is a lengthy neighborhood event:  attendees must show up at a particular time on a 
particular date for an evening of debate, speeches, active persuasion and public voting.  
Attending a caucus is arguably the most burdensome form of election participation available to 
an American citizen” (Hersh 2011, 2).  Much scholarly debate has suggested that because of the 
regulations governing caucus participation, the electorate is distinct in some way from that of 
primary elections, specifically that this method of candidate selection is dominated by activists 
with extreme views.  Studies have shown mixed findings in regards to this conventional wisdom. 
 In an analysis of survey data from Minnesota comparing those who intended to attend the 
1972 Democratic caucus and those who did not, Marshall finds that “data from one state’s 
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caucus systems suggest that low numbers of [attendees] apparently have not led to 
misrepresentation much greater than typically found in primary elections – at least in policy, 
candidate and party-related attitudes” (Marshall 1978, 181).  Thus, Marshall concludes that 
although primary electorates may indeed misrepresent the general public, caucus electorates do 
not misrepresent this population any more substantially.   
Panagopoulos’s “Are Caucuses Bad for Democracy?” uses a multinomial logit model and 
data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey to compare and contrast the 
demographic characteristics of self-identified primary and caucus voters.  The results are mixed:  
Overall, the evidence I describe presents a somewhat mixed picture.  Not unlike previous 
election cycles, turnout data from 2008 confirm that caucuses attracted substantially 
lower levels of participation, compared to primaries.  Moreover, the demographic 
composition of these two electorates differed across the range of traits I investigated, and 
to some extent, primary voters reflected the overall demographic distribution more 
closely than did caucus voters.  Still, the differences I observe were, in my assessment, 
not always very large. […] Overall I conclude that caucuses are not especially 
undemocratic […] I do not believe that caucuses are any better for democracy than 
primary elections. (Panagopoulos 2010, 441)  
 
From the previously discussed studies, it is clear that caucuses have characteristically lower 
turnout than primary races, due to the high political costs associated with them; however, 
evidence is mixed as to whether caucuses are fundamentally unrepresentative. 
 Finally, recent research by Hersh (2011) asks not whether caucus-goers are more 
ideologically extreme or demographically different from primary voters, but rather questions the 
common assertion that they are more politically engaged.  Using data from the 2008 National 
Election Study and Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, Hersh shows that caucus-goers 
and primary voters are distinct from non-voters along a number of dimensions; however, 
particularly in terms of political engagement, they are not that different from one another.  
Caucus-goers are, however, more heavily engaged in their communities than primary voters.  
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 In sum, the possible demographic and ideological differences between primary and 
general election voters is an issue that has been debated extensively since the McGovern Fraser 
Commission revolutionized the nomination process.  Studies that have been conducted have 
found mixed results, with Key and other political scientists claiming vastly distinct electorates 
that have the potential to grossly misrepresent the larger American public, and other researchers 
finding little or no differences between the two populations.  Even more importantly, no prior 
study that I have encountered has endeavored to directly estimate the impact of differences in the 
composition of voters who vote in a party’s primary or caucus versus those partisans who vote in 
the general election on the vote shares secured by specific candidates in specific races.  Rather, 
past research has engaged primarily in speculation in this regard asserting that any observed 
changes will have minimal influence on the nature of the candidates chosen.   
My research makes three distinct contributions to the literature.  First, it marshals 
extensive exit polling data on the composition of partisan primary and general electorates and the 
correspondence between the two in multiple states in the 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections.  
This directly complements previous research in this vein with new data.  Second, it directly uses 
this data to estimate the degree to which the nominating process might have unfolded differently 
if a wider swath of the electorate voted rather than the narrow constituencies that actually do 
participate.  Further, all of the research that I have found examines either primary and general 
electorates or primary and caucus voters; therefore, my examination of both Iowa caucuses and 
New Hampshire and Ohio primaries will fill a void in the current research by analyzing the 
characteristics of all three types of electorates at once. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study aims to more closely examine how the nominating process might be different 
if a larger portion of the electorate voted; specifically, it intends to analyze how presidential 
primaries and caucuses would look if voters in the nominating races had the same demographic 
attributes as voters in the general election, rather than the far more narrow constituencies that 
generally vote in primaries and caucuses.  Further, as I am interested in the relationship between 
both types of nomination processes, I examine data from both primaries and caucuses.   To 
ascertain the answers to the questions I have posed, I utilized state primary, caucus and state 
general election exit poll data available through the Roper Center.  The exit poll data that was 
used in my analysis was originally in raw ASCII format, and I prepared and recoded the 
information for my own use.  In order to analyze caucus systems, I chose to look at Iowa.  
Conventional wisdom has long held that Iowa is an important race in the nomination process, if 
not one of the most important races (Adkins and Dowdle 2001).  To further examine primary 
races, I utilized data from New Hampshire and Ohio nominating races. Ohio is an interesting 
state to examine – I wished to look at state similar in demographics to Iowa, and Ohio was the 
most viable option because of Roper Center exit poll availability. Ohio provides an interesting 
contrast to Iowa and New Hampshire in that the population of the state is far more racially 
diverse; therefore, it is interesting to note if this has an effect on the outcome of my analyses.  
Iowa and New Hampshire are significant as nominating races to examine because of their status 
as the first ones in the primary season. In some later events, the pool of contenders has narrowed 
and the race may appear as though it is a foregone conclusion; however, at the time of the Iowa 
and New Hampshire nominating races this is usually anything but the case.  As the Ohio primary 
is later in the season (in 2008 the Ohio primary was held on March 4, contrasted with Iowa and 
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New Hampshire on January 3 and 8, respectively), the winner of the race is sometimes clear, 
garnering upwards of 90% of the vote; therefore, I eliminated results from Ohio from several of 
the elections in my analysis.   Additionally, I specifically excluded results where the Democratic 
or Republican Party’s nominees were effectively guaranteed success, as in the case of incumbent 
presidents (or Al Gore’s Democratic nomination in the 2000 races).  After eliminating these 
races, the thirteen contests remaining in the sample were:  the 2008 Democratic and Republican 
races in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Ohio; the 2004 Democratic races in Iowa and New 
Hampshire; the 2000 Republican race in Iowa and New Hampshire; and the 1996 Republican 
race in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Ohio.    
To explore whether changing the demographic composition of the electorate would 
significantly affect the outcome of primary or caucus, I first identified several key demographic 
variables that are consistently measured in the exit polls and that could be included in a model of 
vote choice.  The exit polls varied from state to state and over time in terms of which questions 
were asked of voters – the 2008 New Hampshire Democrat primary poll was multi-paged and in-
depth, while the 1996 Iowa Democrat caucus exit poll was twelve questions, neglecting to even 
ask voters’ political affiliation.  For the majority of the races, the variables that I identified as 
being consistently asked and as having the potential to make the voting populations differ were:  
female (coded as 1 for female and 0 for male); age (coded as 1 for under 30, 2 for 30-59, and 3 
for over 60); white (coded 1 for white and 0 for races other than white); black (coded 1 for black 
and 0 for races other than black); ideology (coded 1 for liberal, 2 for moderate and 3 for 
conservative); education (coded 1 for less than a high school degree, 2 for high school, 3 for 
some college, 4 for a college degree and 5 for a post-graduate degree); and income (coded as an 
ordinal scale with the number of units depending on the number of income categories provided 
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in the exit poll question). As the exit poll information that I utilized in this study spanned three 
states over a period of sixteen years, there were quite a bit of differences amongst the variables in 
terms of scale, so I standardized them for my own use.   
For each primary or caucus, I then used these demographic variables in a multinomial 
logit model to estimate the effect of each variable on the probability of voting for each of the 
candidates in a given electoral contest.  Thus, the dependent variable in this particular model was 
presidential candidate choice, and the independent variables were the selected demographic 
characteristics previously outlined.  To ease the subsequent comparisons, these models included 
only respondents affiliated with the party holding the primary or caucus.  
After estimating the multinomial logit model, I used it to calculate the likelihood of vote 
choice for each candidate for each exit poll respondent.  Taking the average of the predicted 
probabilities for each candidate for all respondents in the sample yields predicted vote shares for 
each candidate in the primary or caucus.  I then utilized the information about the demographic 
characteristics of the party’s voters in the general election exit poll along with the results of the 
multinomial logit model to calculate a new set of predicted probabilities and thereby to estimate  
roughly what each presidential candidate’s share of the vote would look like if the primary 
electorate were more demographically similar to the general electorate. Some research suggests 
that there are large differences between voters in primaries and voters; therefore, we can utilize 
analysis of predicted vote share with the primary electorate in relation to predicted vote share 
with the general electorate as a rough estimate of whether this is true or not.  This provides the 
most direct test to date of the electoral consequences of demographic differences between voters 
who head to the polls in a primary or caucus versus in the general election. 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
2008 Democratic Caucus – Iowa 
 
As demonstrated in the above chart, the variables utilized in the Iowa Democratic caucus 
prediction model were female, white, black, age, ideology and income (the specific details of the 
variable categories are listed in the above).  Looking at the differences in percentages of each 
variable represented in the two voting populations proves interesting.  Women comprise about 
2.3% more of the caucus electorate than that of the general election, a slight demographic shift.  
There is a moderate difference, about 5%, between the nonwhite and white populations, with 
14.35% of the general electorate identifying as races other than white, compared with about 
9.07% of caucus voters.  There was a 1.45% increase in exit poll respondents identifying as 
black from the caucus to the general election.  Age provides evidence of a slightly larger 
difference between the two populations:  the general electorate is substantially younger than the 
caucus voting population, with a 10.32% decrease from the “over 60” age category, and 7.30% 
and 3.02% increases in the “30-59” and “under 30” categories, respectively.  The variable 
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representing ideology also shows a substantial demographic shift in general election voters when 
compared to caucus voters:  57.09% of caucus voters identify themselves as “liberal,” compared 
with only 39.32% of the general electorate, a shift of 17.7%.  Most of this shift is into the 
“moderate” category, which experienced a 12.17% increase.  The “conservatives” also show a 
moderate increase of 5.6%.  The variable representing income is far less dramatic than age and 
ideology, although the data demonstrates that the caucus electorate is slightly wealthier than the 
general electorate.  There is moderate variation with regard to electorate demographics, with age 
and ideology showing the largest differences.   
 
 
Although the data initially appears to support research suggesting that there are large 
demographic differences in the populations, analysis of the predicted vote shares proves 
interesting.  As demonstrated in the first chart above, the multinomial logit model yielded a 
predicted vote share of 33.7% for Barack Obama in the 2008 Iowa caucus (the full results of this 
analysis, including predictions for other candidates, are available in the appendix).  To estimate 
how Obama would have fared in the caucus if the electorate more closely resembled the 
demographic characteristics of all Iowa Democrats that participated in the general election in 
November, I used the multinomial model with data on the composition of the electorate from 
Iowa’s general election exit poll to calculate a second predicted vote share for Obama, 34.7%. 
This is a difference of only about one percentage point – it suggests that if the 2008 Iowa general 
electorate had turned out to the 2008 Iowa caucus, there would not have been much variation in 
the results of the election.  In terms of how accurate the information in the poll was in generating 
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the model, the actual vote share for Obama in the 2008 Iowa Democratic caucus was 38%, a 
difference of 4.3%.  While this is not exactly accurate, the predicted vote share is fairly close to 
the share of the vote that Obama actually received in the caucus.   
The disjunction between the rather substantial differences between the compositions of 
the caucus and party’s general election electorates and the lack of a significant effect on vote 
share is initially surprising.  However, a closer inspection of the multinomial logit results in 
appendix table 1 suggests a possible answer to why the demographic differences had such a 
small effect in this case.  Here the omitted category is Hillary Clinton; thus each variable 
coefficient tells us whether that variable raises or lowers the probability of a caucus-goer voting 
for the candidate in question versus a baseline probability of voting for Clinton.  From this we 
can see that each of the three demographic variables – race, age, and ideology – that differed 
significantly from the caucus to the general election electorate had a significant impact on 
support for Obama.  However, they had effects in opposite directions.  Non-whites were more 
likely to vote for Obama and comprised a greater share of the electorate in November than they 
did in the January caucus.  Similarly, older voters were less likely to vote for Obama than 
younger voters, and they were a smaller share of the November electorate than they were in the 
caucus itself.  Both of these changes would have helped Obama.  By contrast, moderates and 
conservatives were significantly less likely to vote for Obama, and these voters comprised a 
much greater share of Democratic votes in the general election than in the caucus.  Thus, two of 
the demographic differences would have redounded to Obama’s advantage, and one would have 
hurt him considerably.  The net result was little predicted change in vote share if voters 
resembled those that voted in November versus those that actually caucused in January.  
Utilizing the multinomial logit results in this way provides an idea of why, despite demographic 
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changes, vote choice did not differ greatly.  Looking at the results tables in each primary or 
caucus, the multinomial logits can be used to investigate how each constituency has the ability to 
affect the anticipated vote share of each candidate in each race.    
2008 Democratic Primary – New Hampshire 
 
Looking at the individual variables in the primary and general electorates, the 2008 New 
Hampshire Democratic Primary appears to demonstrate slight differences between the voting 
populations.  The New Hampshire general electorate consists of a larger share of women voters 
than does the primary population – 66.13%, in comparison to 61.62% – a difference of 4.51%.  
In terms of race, there was not a distinguishable divergence between the electoral compositions – 
there were about 1% fewer voters identifying as “white” and about .13% fewer voters identifying 
as “black” in the general election, extremely modest numbers.  Likewise, the variable age3 does 
not show substantial differences between the 2008 Democratic New Hampshire primary and 
general election – the results show minor differences in the “under 30,” “30-59,” and “over 60” 
categories of .11%, 2.79%, and 2.90%, respectively.  Ideology is the only category showing a 
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discernible difference between the primary and general electorates:  in the primary election, 71% 
of Democratic voters identified themselves as “liberal,” a statistic that fell to 54.52% in the 
general election – a sizable difference of 16.48%.  As the number of liberals fell from the 
primary to the general election, so did the number of moderates rise:  26% of voters self-
identified as “moderate” in the New Hampshire primary, a number that jumped to 41.74% in the 
general election – a difference of 15.74%.  The number of registered Democrats identifying as 
“conservative” also rose slightly, from 3% in the primary to 3.74% in the general election.  
While the other figures have consistently shown only slight changes, ideology shows a 
substantial demographic shift from primary to general election voters.  Examining the last 
variable, income6, provides mixed conclusions.  0.98%, 2.62%, and 1.92% fewer general 
election voters characterized themselves as earning “under $15,000,” “$30,000-$49,999,” and 
“$50,000-$74,999,” respectively.  3.14%, .96%, and 1.42% more of the general electorate 
surveyed in the exit polls identified themselves as earning “$15,000-$29,999,” “$75,000-
$99,999,” and “over $100,000,” respectively.  These numbers are neither substantial nor 
consistent enough to establish a pattern distinguishing one voting population from another.  
Voters in the 2008 Democratic New Hampshire primary appear to be demographically similar to 
the general election voters in terms of gender, race, age, and income; the two populations differ 
only with regard to voter ideology.  
 
 
In the Democratic New Hampshire presidential primary, the model of predicted vote 
share forecasts about 37.6% of voters casting a ballot for Barack Obama.  According to the 
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model, if the general electorate had voted in the primary, Obama would have received 34.7% of 
the vote share, a decrease of about 2.9%.  This is a larger difference than that of the previously 
discussed Iowan Democratic 2008 prediction model, but this is still relatively small – this data 
potentially contradicts researchers who assert that there is some drastic difference between 
primary and general election voters.  With regard to the accuracy of the prediction, the actual 
vote share for Obama in the 2008 Democratic New Hampshire Primary was about 36%; this 
means that the prediction model was only 1.6% away from the actual vote total, an extremely 
close number.  Despite the demographic differences of the primary and general election 
populations, it does not seem to make much of a difference in terms of final vote choice.  
According to the vote share prediction model, had the party’s general electorate shown up to the 
polls in the 2008 Democratic New Hampshire primary, there would have been only a 2.9% 
difference in vote share for Obama.  As Clinton won the election with 39% of the vote, Obama 
losing 2.9% would have had no effect on the results of the New Hampshire primary. 
2008 Democratic Primary – Ohio 
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In the 2008 Ohio Democratic race, there was not much variation in terms of voter gender 
from the primary to the general election – 63.89% of primary voters were female and 62.61% of 
general election voters were female, a difference of only 1.28%.  With regard to race, there are 
more substantial differences in this race than in the previous two – perhaps this is because Ohio 
is a far more racially diverse state than either Iowa or New Hampshire.  From the primary to the 
general election, there was an increase of 5.87% of voters identifying as “white” in the general 
election compared with the primary.  Likewise, the number of voters identifying as “black” fell 
by 6.5% from the primary to the general election.  These numbers are far greater than any of the 
previous figures pertaining to race from the Iowa and New Hampshire races.  In terms of age, the 
general election saw increases of 3.52% and 5.58% from the “under 30” and “over 60” age 
groups, respectively, from the primary to the general election.  For the “30-59” age category, 
there was a drop of 9.1%, from 65.29% in the primary to 56.19% in the general election – these 
results, while not consistently showing an older or younger electorate, demonstrate that in any 
case, the age of the general electorate is distinct from the age of the primary electorate.  The 
variable ideology shows further the demographic differences between the Ohio primary and 
general electorates.  In the primary, 47.32% of voters identified themselves as “liberal,” 
compared with 35.66% in the general election – this is a difference of 11.66%.  As this number 
fell, the percentages of voters classifying themselves as “moderate” and “conservative” rose 
5.73% and 5.92% respectively from the primary to the general election.  Examining the variable 
income6 demonstrates that voters in the Ohio primary are clearly more wealthy than those in the 
general election.  Additionally, voters in the Ohio primary are more educated than voters in the 
Ohio general election, with 6.64% more general election voters having a high school diploma or 
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less than primary voters and 8.75% fewer general election voters having a college degree than 
primary voters.     
 The 2008 Democratic race in Ohio provides us with the first substantial differences in the 
models’ predicted vote shares.  According to the primary prediction, Obama should receive 
about 50% of the votes.  Compared to the general election’s predicted vote share of about 45%, 
the difference is about 5%, a substantial number in a race where a few percentage points can 
determine a victor.    
 
 
Looking at the actual vote share that Obama received in the 2008 Democratic Ohio 
primary, it is evident that this particular model is not extremely accurate – the actual primary 
vote share that Obama received was 44%, a 6% difference from the model.  Perhaps the voters 
sampled in the exit poll were simply not representative of the average Ohioan, or perhaps the 
variables surveyed in this prediction model do not do a good job of explaining vote choice.  In 
any case, if the model had been more accurate (say, only 2% off of the actual Obama vote share 
of 44%), then the predicted primary vote share would have been 46%, far closer to the general 
election’s prediction of 45%, and more in line with the pattern of relatively close primary and 
caucus vote shares.  
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2008 Republican Caucus – Iowa  
 
In the 2008 Iowa Republican caucus, there were substantially fewer women than in the 
general election – 46.10 and 53.99, respectively – a difference of 7.89%.  With regard to race, 
there is not a large difference between the primary and general electorates; only 1.78% fewer 
voters identify as “white” and .48% more voters identify as “black” in the general election as 
compared to the caucus.  Examining age evidences some differences – the general electorate is 
substantially younger than the primary electorate (“under 30” saw a 5.53% increase and “30-59” 
saw a 5.57% increase from primary to general election voters, while “over 60” voters decreased 
by about 11.41%).  There are quite large distinctions between the two electorates in terms of 
ideology – 90.38% of the Republican caucus electorate identified as “conservative,” compared to 
66.07% of general election voters, a difference of 24.31%.  Likewise, only 9.32% of caucus 
voters identified as “moderate,” a number that jumped to 30.15% in the general election – this is 
a difference of 20.83%.  “Liberal” Republicans also saw an increase of 3.48% from the caucus to 
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the general election.  The data pertaining to income does not have enough of a pattern to remark 
on its contribution to the demographic differences between the two populations.  
The 2008 Iowa Republican caucus shows a fairly moderate difference between the 
primary and general election vote share predictions.  McCain was predicted to have received 
about 10.1% of the caucus vote in Iowa.  According to the model, had the general electorate 
shown up to the polls on the day of the caucus, there would have been a 3.6% difference, and 
McCain would have received 13.7% of the electorate’s vote.  This difference, while larger than 
some of the previous calculations, is still relatively small.   
 
 
There is a 2.9% difference between the actual primary vote share and the predicted vote share in 
this election, a moderate, but not large, difference.  From the above analysis of individual caucus 
and general electorate variables, it is clear that there are several very large dissimilarities 
between the Iowa caucus and general election voters.  These two distinct populations may 
potentially translate into the 3.6% difference between the caucus and general election vote share 
predictions. 
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2008 Republican Primary – New Hampshire 
 
While there certainly are differences between the electorates, the degree is far less than in 
the other races that have previously been examined.  From the primary to the general election in 
New Hampshire in 2008, there was a modest increase of 3.08% of women voters.  There is not 
much variation with regard to race from the primary to the general electorate – only about 0.62% 
and 0.6% fewer voters identifying themselves as “white” and “black” respectively.  The numbers 
of non-white voters in New Hampshire are extremely small to begin with – only 2.47% of 
primary voters and 3.09% of general election voters in New Hampshire do not characterize 
themselves as “white.”  The data concerning voter age shows a very slight increase in younger 
voters in the general election, but not enough of a shift to make a substantial distinction between 
the voting populations.  Income shows a moderate difference – voters in the general election are 
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less wealthy than those in the primary – all income categories below “$100,000+” show an 
increase from the primary to the general election.  The percentage of voters at the top tier of the 
income bracket decreased from 39.70% in the New Hampshire primary to 28.63% in the general 
election, a difference of about 11.07%.  Additionally, the general electorate is somewhat less 
educated than the primary electorate; “no high school” and “high school” both show increases, 
while “some college,” “college,” and “post-grad” show decreases.  Overall, there are modest 
demographic distinctions between the primary and general electorate in the 2008 New 
Hampshire Republican race in terms of income and education.   
The 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary predicted vote share for McCain was 
32.4%, and the prediction utilizing the general election population was 32.2%, a difference of 
0.2%: 
 
 
These numbers are extremely close, suggesting that there are little demographic differences 
between the two electorates.   Additionally, there is a moderately large (4.6%) difference 
between the actual primary vote share and the prediction generated by the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  28
 
2008 Republican Primary – Ohio 
  
Overall, there is some, but not a large amount, of variation between the two populations.  
In terms of gender there is a slight increase (1.27%) of female voters from the primary to the 
general election.  There is almost no difference between the two populations with regard to race, 
as there is less than a one percent difference between the two populations for this variable.  The 
general election population is moderately younger than the primary population, with 4.43% 
fewer voters identifying as “over 60,” while 0.59% and 3.84% more voters characterize 
themselves as “30-59” and “under 30, respectively.  With respect to ideology, primary voters are 
less conservative and more moderate than general election voters – about 10.33% fewer 
“conservatives” and 12.57% more “moderates” voted in the presidential general election in Ohio.  
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With respect to ideology, primary voters are less conservative and more moderate than general 
election voters – about 10.33% fewer “conservatives” and 12.57% more “moderates” voted in 
the presidential general election in Ohio.  In this race, the results pertaining to income do not 
show substantial differences.  The general electorate is moderately less educated than the 
primary electorate; the general voting population saw about 7.57% fewer voters identifying as 
having “some college,” “college,” or “post-grad” experience, while 8.82% more general election 
voters have solely a high school diploma.  These differences, while not the largest among the 
data that has been examined, are still fairly substantial.  
As previously discussed, the Ohio race is far later in the nomination season than both 
Iowa and New Hampshire; therefore, the candidate who will become the party’s nominee is 
usually clearer at that point.  In the 2008 Ohio Republican primary, the predicted vote share for 
McCain is 56.8%, and in the general election it is 56.4%, a difference of 0.4%.  This very small 
difference between the two suggests that there are little demographic or ideological differences 
between the two populations.   
 
 
The actual vote share in the 2008 Ohio Republican primary for McCain was 60%.  This statistic 
is 3.2% higher than the primary prediction, a relatively close number, especially considering how 
high the vote share percentage is for McCain – he still would win the nomination race regardless 
of if he garnered 60% of the vote or 57.1% of the vote.   
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2004 Democratic Caucus – Iowa 
 
Examination of the individual variables in this race shows that there are substantially fewer 
women voters in the Iowa caucuses – 54.79% of caucus attendees were female, compared to 
62.39% of general election voters, a substantial difference of 7.6%.  With regard to age, the 
caucus population is older than that of the general election – 5.82% and 2.29% more voters 
identified as “under 30” and “30-59” in the general election than in the primary, respectively, 
while there was an 8.11% decrease in the number of voters characterizing themselves as “over 
60.”  Income in this race is hard to examine because the exit poll asked respondents to select one 
of two income categories, instead of the usual six that the other exit polls request.   Despite this 
limitation, it appears that caucus voters in the 2004 Iowa race are slightly less wealthy.  Ideology 
shows a large distinction between the two populations – 61.83% of the caucus electorate 
identifies as “liberal,” compared with only 33.88% of Democrats in the general election, a 
difference of 27.95%.  Additionally, 33.49% of caucus voters characterize themselves as 
“moderate,” compared to 53.58% of general election voters, a difference of 20.09%.  The 
percentages of “conservative” Democrats increased from 4.68% in the caucus to 12.55% in the 
general election, a difference of 7.87%.  In terms of education, voters in the general election are 
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more “middle-of-the-road” than caucus voters – 4.03% fewer general election voters have no 
college degree, and 15.11% fewer general election voters have a post-grad degree.  
For the 2004 Iowa Democratic caucus, the model’s predicted vote share is 34.5%, and the 
Iowa general election predicted vote share is 34.7%, only a 0.2% difference.  These numbers are 
extremely close, again suggesting that there is not much variation between the populations that 
turn out to vote in primary and general elections.    
 
 
In the 2004 Iowa race, John Kerry actually received 38% of the vote, a difference of about 3.5%.  
While this is not exactly precise, it is close to the predicted vote share that was generated by the 
model.   
This race has the largest variation between caucus and general election demographics in 
the individual examination of the variables that has been seen thus far in my research.  With 
these large differences in genders, ages, incomes, ideologies and educations, one would logically 
expect to see a large difference in the predicted vote shares of these populations; however, there 
is only a 0.2% difference between the predictions.  This suggests that although there are distinct 
voting populations, this does not translate to vote choice; the electorates may be demographically 
and ideologically different from each other, but they are predicted to support Kerry at almost the 
same rate regardless.   
 
 
 
  32
2004 Democratic Primary – New Hampshire 
 
While there is not much contrast between primary and general election voters with regard 
to the variables female, white, or black (with a 2.24% decrease, a 2.23% decrease and a .91% 
increase, respectively), in terms of age the populations differ.  The general electorate is slightly 
younger than that of the primary – there is a 5.09% increase in voters identifying themselves as 
“under 30” in the general election, and 2.03% and 3.06% decreases in voters who characterize 
themselves as “30-59” and “over 60.”  With regard to ideology, 60.89% of primary voters label 
themselves as “liberal,” compared to 48.83% of general election voters, a sizable difference of 
12.06%. Additionally, 11.2% more “moderate” and 0.65% more “conservative” voters showed 
up to polls in the general election than in the primary, marking the 2004 New Hampshire general 
electorate as less liberal and more moderate than the primary electorate.  There are some 
  33
differences in income and education between these two races, but there is nothing consistent or 
substantial enough to constitute a pattern.  
 For the 2004 New Hampshire Democratic primary, the predicted vote share for Kerry is 
38.4%, and the prediction for the general election is 39.2%.  This is a difference of 0.8%, which 
is very slight, suggesting that the primary and general electorates are very similar.   
 
 
The actual vote share in comparison with the predictions is 38.0%, a difference of 0.4%.  These 
numbers are extremely close, demonstrating that the model is fairly accurate.   
 
2000 Republican Caucus – Iowa 
 
While the variable female does not show much of a difference, only a 0.1% decrease 
from caucus voters to general election voters, the variable age shows a sizable distinction.  The 
general election population is far younger – in the caucus, 9.72% of voters identified themselves 
as “under 30,” a number that rose to 19.63 in the general election, almost a ten-percentage point 
difference.  In addition, there was an increase of 5.39% of “30-59” year old voters, with 55.96% 
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of the caucus placing themselves in this category, compared to 61.35% of general election 
voters.  Additionally, 34.32% of caucus voters self-identified as “over 60” in the caucus and only 
19.02% of the general election voters did the same – this is a difference of 15.3%.  In terms of 
ideology, there are also large differences. In the presidential caucus, 21.51% fewer voters 
identified as “conservative,” and 21.33% more labeled themselves as “moderate,” demonstrating 
the large ideological differences between these two populations. Examining the variable income 
additionally shows that the caucus voters are slightly wealthier than general election voters.  
 
 
The model’s predicted vote share for the 2000 Iowa Republican caucus is 43.3%, 1.7% 
away from the predicted vote share for the general election of 41.7%.  These numbers are very 
close, further suggesting that there is not much demographic variation between the primary and 
general electorate.   The actual vote share in the Iowa caucus was 41%, a difference of about 
2.4%.  While not entirely accurate, these predictions are still fairly close.   
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2000 Republican Primary – New Hampshire 
 
Analyzing the individual variables’ variance from the primary to the general election 
provides evidence that there are only slight differences between the voting populations.  From 
the primary to the general election, the variable female’s change is almost negligible, 
experiencing just a 0.07% increase.  With respect to age, the general electorate is slightly 
younger than that of the primary.  In terms of ideology, the general election voting population is 
slightly less liberal and conservative (3.22% and 4.14%, respectively) and more moderate (by 
7.37%) than the primary population.  The results regarding income are too inconsistent and 
unsubstantial to make any broad statement about the demographic differences between primary 
and general electorates, as is the data regarding education.  
For the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary, the model’s prediction for Bush vote 
share is 38.1%, and it is 38.3% for the general election, a very small difference of 0.2%.    
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The actual vote share for George W. Bush in the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary was 
30%, a difference of 8.1%.  Unlike the previous models, this is quite a large disparity between 
the predicted vote shares, suggesting that the prediction model does not do an adequate job of 
forecasting popular vote for Bush in the 2000 New Hampshire Republican primary.  Perhaps the 
sample from the exit poll was unrepresentative of the New Hampshire population, or the 
variables utilized in the prediction model are not accurate measures of probability of voting for 
Bush.  Unlike models using data from some of the other, more extensive exit polls, the 
predictions in this race only utilized five variables:  female, age, ideology, income and education.  
Perhaps if other variables were available the model would have been able to predict primary and 
general election vote share in a more successful manner.  
 
1996 Republican Caucus – Iowa 
 
This particular model utilized only four variables:  female, age, ideology and income.  
There was a moderate increase in the percentage of females in the general electorate from the 
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caucus electorate (3.59%).  Further, the general election voting population is younger than the 
caucus voting population – from the caucus to the general election there was a 2.92% increase in 
“under 30” Republicans, a 4.37% increase in “30-59” Republicans, and a corresponding 7.3% 
decrease in “over 60” Republicans.  Additionally, the general electorate is less conservative than 
the caucus – 74.74% of caucus voters classified themselves as “conservative,” while only 
66.14% of general election voters did, a difference of 8.6%.  21.23% of Republican caucus 
voters identified themselves as “moderate,” while 28.57% of general election voters did, a 
difference of 7.34%.  Examining the reported income of caucus and general election voters also 
proves interesting, as the general electorate is substantially less wealthy than the caucus 
electorate.  
In the 1996 Iowa Republican caucus, my model predicted that Bob Dole would receive 
about 24.1% of the vote.  Utilizing the same model, the vote share that Dole would receive had 
the general electorate voted at the caucuses would be 22.2%, a difference of 1.9%.  This small 
difference suggests that there may not be large demographic distinctions between the two 
populations, as vote share did not change a great deal.   
 
 
The actual reported vote share in the 1996 Iowa Republican caucus for Dole was 26%, a 
difference of 1.9%.  While this data does not exactly match up with the caucus predicted vote 
share from the model, it is extremely close.   
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1996 Republican Primary – New Hampshire 
 
Examining the individual variables in the primary and general electorates in this race 
shows demographic differences.  There is a moderate (4.23%) increase of women voters in the 
general election voting population.  Additionally, the general electorate is younger on average 
than the primary electorate – “under 30” Republicans saw a 5.54% increase and “30-59” year old 
Republicans saw almost a 6% decrease in general election voters.  With regard to ideology, the 
number of Republicans in the 1996 New Hampshire primary classifying themselves as “liberal” 
and “moderate” increased by 2.1% and 9.57%, respectively, and the number of self-identified 
“conservative” Republicans decreased by 11.66%.  Additionally, the general election population 
in this race is moderately less wealthy than the primary population, with the top three income 
categories experiencing decreases and the bottom three income categories experiencing 
increases.  
In the 1996 New Hampshire Republican primary, the predicted vote share generated by 
the model was 26.8%.  In the 1996 New Hampshire general election, predicted vote share for 
Dole is 26.4, a 0.4% difference.  This small gap in vote share suggests again that the 
demographic qualities of the primary and general electorates may potentially be similar, as Dole 
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would receive about the same amount of the vote share had the general electorate voted in the 
New Hampshire primary.  
 
 
The actual vote share received by Dole in the 1996 New Hampshire Republican primary was 
26%.  This is extremely close (a 0.8% difference) to the predicted vote share, which 
demonstrates that the poll was fairly accurate.    
 
1996 Republican Primary – Ohio 
 
There is a moderate increase in the amount of female voters in the general election from the 
primary (about 2.8%).  Additionally, the voters in the Ohio general election are slightly younger 
than those in the Ohio primary, and more moderate.  With regard to income, the general 
electorate is less wealthy than the primary electorate – Republicans making “under $15,000” and 
“$15,000-$29,999” rose by 3.48% and 3.18% respectively, while voters earning “$30,000-
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$49,999,” “$50,000-$74,999” and “$75,000-$99,000” decreased by 3.44%, 2.17% and 3.76%, 
respectively.    
 In the 1996 Ohio Republican primary race, the prediction for Dole vote share is 68%, 
while the predicted general election vote share for Dole was 68.1%.  This difference of 0.1% is 
very small.   
 
 
In addition, the actual primary vote share for the 1996 Ohio Republican primary race is 66%, a 
difference of 2% from the predicted primary vote share.  This demonstrates that the poll was 
fairly accurate in assessing the probability of voting for Dole in this race.   
CONCLUSION 
 Through analysis of the exit poll data, it is clear that there are moderate to substantial 
demographic and ideological differences between primary and general election voting 
populations.  For the most part, when compared to the primary, the general election populations 
are younger, more female, more moderate, less educated, and lower income.  Ideology is 
consistently the variable that exhibits the largest differences between the two electorates.  
Additionally, with the exception of the 1996 Iowa Republican nominating race, caucus exit poll 
data showed substantially greater distinction from the general electorate than did primary data, 
especially with regard to ideology.  However, with the exception of the 2008 Ohio Democratic 
primary, there were not many differences between the primary/caucus and general election 
predicted vote shares.    
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My analyses and results suggest that although these two electorates may be 
demographically and ideologically distinct, each voting population’s final candidate choice is not 
substantially different. Even in the 2004 Iowa Democratic caucus, the race that showed the 
largest demographic and ideological differences between the caucus and general electorates, 
there was only a 0.2% difference in predicted vote share. This data suggests that although 
primary, caucus, and general election voters may be different, the country is not in grave danger 
of electing an unrepresentative candidate – even if the general election voting population, which 
is supposedly more representative of the average American, showed up to the polls at the 
caucuses or primaries, there would not be a substantial change in electoral outcome. In this way, 
my study supports the research of Geer, whose research suggested that while there are 
discernible differences between primary and general election voting populations, “the biases are 
small enough to have few consequences when selecting candidates” (Geer 1988, 929). 
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Appendix Table 1: Multinomial Logit Model for 2008 Democratic Iowa Caucuses 
 
 Obama Biden Dodd Edwards Gravel Kucinich Richardson 
        
Female -0.201 -1.145*** -1.385*** -0.376** 13.163 -1.349** -0.380 
 (0.158) (0.294) (0.434) (0.168) (1,215.142) (0.663) (0.256) 
White -0.129 15.808 -0.199 1.291* 14.379 -1.045 -0.533 
 (0.430) (2,006.385) (1.084) (0.777) (6,432.546) (1.134) (0.606) 
Black 2.183*** 1.197 0.549 0.294 3.051 -14.690 -0.263 
 (0.559) (2,437.233) (1.506) (1.101) (7,896.050) (2,543.523) (0.984) 
Age -1.112*** -0.396* -0.872*** -0.230* -14.544 -0.947** -0.446** 
 (0.114) (0.222) (0.313) (0.125) (968.579) (0.474) (0.186) 
Ideology -0.294** 0.026 -0.096 0.085 -12.636 -15.010 -0.295 
 (0.135) (0.248) (0.366) (0.140) (1,080.402) (775.407) (0.229) 
Income 0.107** 0.269*** 0.160 0.170*** -0.317 -0.245 0.093 
 (0.048) (0.098) (0.137) (0.054) (0.723) (0.208) (0.081) 
Constant 2.511*** -17.300 -0.492 -1.745** -2.737 16.328 0.174 
 (0.541) (2,006.385) (1.382) (0.868) (6,705.194) (775.408) (0.820) 
        
Observations 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294 
 
Standard errors in parentheses;  All significance tests are two-tailed. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Note: Hillary Clinton is the baseline category.
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Appendix Table 2: Multinomial Logit Model for 2008 Democratic New Hampshire Primary 
 
 Obama Biden Dodd Edwards Gravel Kucinich Richardson 
        
Female -0.606*** -20.277 -16.207 -0.591*** 18.686 -0.872* -1.070** 
 (0.160) (11,302.352) (2,569.907) (0.207) (19,592.596) (0.503) (0.422) 
Black 2.091*** -17.622 -2.351 -18.503 -15.875 -17.996 -18.581 
 (0.657) (55,839.172) (12,090.934) (10,870.158) (63,524.451) (27,013.097) (24,779.237) 
Age -0.736*** -0.298 -1.203 -0.004 -0.252 -0.723* 0.069 
 (0.135) (1.170) (1.920) (0.175) (1.569) (0.414) (0.359) 
Ideology -0.589*** -18.856 1.125 -0.451** -18.953 -2.075** -0.435 
 (0.157) (12,172.531) (1.680) (0.204) (20,177.387) (1.023) (0.422) 
Income 0.083 0.349 -14.371 0.057 -0.487 -0.056 0.112 
 (0.052) (0.568) (938.640) (0.067) (0.689) (0.164) (0.141) 
Constant 2.063*** 14.241 12.702 -0.351 -2.758 1.461 -2.207* 
 (0.435) (12,172.532) (938.652) (0.596) (28,124.665) (1.539) (1.240) 
        
Observations 938 938 938 938 938 938 938 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Hillary Clinton is the baseline category.  Given the very homogeneous racial demographics in New Hampshire this model would 
not converge with both white and black dummies (or with just a white a dummy).  The black dummy variable in the Obama model is 
positive and statistically significant.  In the models for all other candidates the standard errors are very high.  As a robustness check, 
we also estimated a simple logit model with voting for Obama as the dependent variable.  These results, which are very similar to 
those presented here, are summarized in Appendix Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 3: Logistic Regression Model of Support for Obama in 2008 NH Primary 
 
 
 Obama 
  
Female -0.371** 
 (0.145) 
White -0.549 
 (0.383) 
Black 1.910** 
 (0.747) 
Age -0.691*** 
 (0.125) 
Ideology -0.431*** 
 (0.149) 
Income 0.074 
 (0.048) 
Constant 1.798*** 
 (0.525) 
  
Observations 938 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4: Logit Model of Support for Obama in 2008 Democratic Ohio Primary 
 
 
 Obama 
  
Female -0.541*** 
 (0.163) 
White -0.903*** 
 (0.303) 
Black 2.124*** 
 (0.373) 
Age -0.652*** 
 (0.139) 
Ideology -0.197 
 (0.126) 
Income 0.013 
 (0.057) 
Education 0.272*** 
 (0.077) 
Constant 1.332** 
 (0.522) 
  
Observations 932 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Only Clinton and Obama were still in the race by the time of the Ohio primary; hence a 
simple logit model was used. 
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Appendix Table 5: Multinomial Logit Model for 2008 Republican Iowa Caucus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Huckabee is the baseline category.  The standard errors for black are very high, due to the racial homogeneity of the state and 
resulting collinearity in the race variables.  Replicating the model without the black dummy variable yields virtually identical results. 
 
 McCain Giuliani Hunter Paul Romney Thompson 
       
Female -0.602*** -0.349 -0.284 -0.787*** -0.410** -0.807*** 
 (0.226) (0.313) (0.616) (0.278) (0.159) (0.198) 
White -1.425* -1.935** 12.348 -0.448 -0.402 -0.702 
 (0.856) (0.857) (1,754.394) (1.182) (0.832) (0.930) 
Black -14.776 -15.915 -2.347 -15.029 -14.339 -15.010 
 (1,446.325) (2,440.556) (4,530.032) (1,877.584) (997.598) (1,376.478) 
Age 1.032*** -0.051 -0.700 -0.253 0.323** 0.213 
 (0.197) (0.258) (0.470) (0.199) (0.131) (0.156) 
Ideology -1.355*** -1.091*** 11.794 -1.068*** -0.551* 0.281 
 (0.310) (0.417) (446.527) (0.382) (0.285) (0.436) 
Income 0.222*** 0.224** -0.221 -0.203** 0.195*** 0.096 
 (0.081) (0.112) (0.211) (0.091) (0.057) (0.068) 
Constant 0.973 2.215 -48.976 3.317** 0.271 -1.635 
 (1.322) (1.552) (2,207.345) (1.614) (1.198) (1.603) 
       
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 
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Appendix Table 6: Multinomial Logit Model for 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Huckabee is the baseline category. The standard errors for black are very high, due to the racial homogeneity of the state and 
resulting collinearity in the race variables.  Replicating the model without the black dummy variable yields virtually identical results. 
 
 
 
 
 McCain Giuliani Hunter Paul Romney Thompson 
       
Female -0.252 -0.154 -1.305 -0.792** -0.147 -0.460 
 (0.239) (0.296) (1.222) (0.384) (0.237) (0.554) 
White 1.776 0.014 -2.517* 29.324 0.709 28.930 
 (1.170) (0.939) (1.394) (2105283.387) (0.841) (3577399.376) 
Black -13.981 -0.276 -17.629 13.804 -1.012 13.393 
 (804.624) (1.291) (5,969.370) (2105284.154) (1.218) (3577400.645) 
Age 0.357* -0.015 -0.041 -0.750** 0.267 -0.157 
 (0.208) (0.261) (0.871) (0.315) (0.207) (0.479) 
Ideology -0.395** -0.411* -0.839 0.046 0.006 1.114 
 (0.198) (0.239) (0.743) (0.316) (0.205) (0.735) 
Income 0.171** 0.300*** -0.383 0.123 0.248*** 0.597** 
 (0.087) (0.112) (0.381) (0.130) (0.086) (0.235) 
Education 0.196 -0.084 0.138 0.284 0.032 -0.469* 
 (0.124) (0.154) (0.587) (0.189) (0.123) (0.270) 
Constant -1.983 -0.121 2.573 -30.036 -1.561 -34.571 
 (1.398) (1.318) (3.045) (2105283.387) (1.146) (3577399.376) 
       
Observations 756 756 756 756 756 756 
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Appendix Table 7: Multinomial Logit Model for 2008 Ohio Republican Primary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Huckabee is the baseline category. The standard errors for black are very high, due to the 
racial homogeneity of the state and resulting collinearity in the race variables.  Replicating the 
model without the black dummy variable yields virtually identical results. 
 
 McCain Paul 
   
Female -0.167 -1.088** 
 (0.191) (0.551) 
White 0.675 12.074 
 (0.604) (583.921) 
Black -0.794 0.121 
 (1.392) (1,321.219) 
Age 0.394** -0.166 
 (0.156) (0.398) 
Ideology -0.655*** -0.878** 
 (0.185) (0.393) 
Income 0.131* -0.001 
 (0.074) (0.199) 
Education 0.080 0.344 
 (0.093) (0.253) 
Constant -0.007 -12.489 
 (0.856) (583.922) 
   
Observations 508 508 
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Appendix Table 8: Multinomial Logit Model for 2004 Democratic Iowa Caucus 
 
 
 Kerry Clark Edwards Gephardt Kucinich Lieberman Uncommitted 
        
Female 0.037 -0.170 0.538*** -0.271 0.935** 1.284 0.714** 
 (0.170) (0.473) (0.185) (0.232) (0.365) (1.725) (0.357) 
Age 0.420*** 0.147 0.346** 0.441** -0.231 -2.625 -0.261 
 (0.132) (0.377) (0.143) (0.178) (0.266) (1.829) (0.261) 
Ideology 0.359** 0.301 0.279 0.584*** -1.477** 3.586** 0.370 
 (0.161) (0.429) (0.174) (0.200) (0.607) (1.421) (0.312) 
Income 0.082 0.626 0.359* -0.207 0.398 14.481 -0.257 
 (0.178) (0.511) (0.191) (0.248) (0.347) (509.549) (0.349) 
Education -0.270** -0.101 -0.306*** -0.560*** -0.005 -0.501 0.094 
 (0.110) (0.303) (0.118) (0.156) (0.220) (1.082) (0.220) 
Constant -0.474 -3.846*** -1.179** -0.985 -0.644 -34.957 -1.880** 
 (0.488) (1.415) (0.534) (0.667) (1.065) (1,019.109) (0.940) 
        
Observations 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Howard Dean is the baseline category.  Race was not asked on this exit poll. 
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Appendix Table 9: Multinomial Logit Model for 2004 Democratic New Hampshire 
Primary 
 
 
 Kerry Clark Edwards Kucinich Lieberman 
      
Female 0.025 0.188 -0.497 -0.836 -0.331 
 (0.261) (0.371) (0.375) (1.039) (0.470) 
White 0.811 0.625 0.520 14.551 15.264 
 (0.775) (1.130) (1.121) (3,947.103) (2,057.697) 
Black 0.716 1.244 -14.655 0.136 0.258 
 (1.263) (1.662) (2,282.129) (7,274.999) (3,658.380) 
Age 0.185 -0.307 0.165 0.536 0.535 
 (0.229) (0.316) (0.352) (1.041) (0.420) 
Ideology 0.358 0.401 0.134 -14.200 0.360 
 (0.226) (0.308) (0.342) (842.142) (0.400) 
Income 0.019 -0.222* 0.127 -0.427 -0.071 
 (0.092) (0.126) (0.140) (0.380) (0.170) 
Education -0.349*** -0.116 -0.017 0.867 -0.150 
 (0.128) (0.178) (0.195) (0.783) (0.234) 
Constant -0.292 -0.426 -2.351 -5.970 -17.473 
 (1.032) (1.453) (1.565) (4,035.944) (2,057.697) 
      
Observations 394 394 394 394 394 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Dean was the baseline category.  The education question was only asked of half the 
sample; however, re-estimating the models omitting this variable yields virtually identical 
results. 
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Appendix Table 10: Multinomial Logit Model for 2000 Republican Iowa Caucus 
 
 
 Bush Bauer Forbes Hatch Keyes 
      
Female 1.023*** 1.638*** 1.051*** 0.690 0.921** 
 (0.377) (0.426) (0.382) (0.822) (0.406) 
Age 0.470* -0.656** 0.182 -0.385 -0.513* 
 (0.269) (0.310) (0.272) (0.581) (0.293) 
Ideology 0.300 1.953*** 0.465* 1.187 1.034*** 
 (0.258) (0.478) (0.265) (0.999) (0.324) 
Income 0.130 -0.304* 0.027 -0.680* -0.073 
 (0.154) (0.182) (0.156) (0.408) (0.168) 
Constant -0.041 -3.257** 0.095 -2.809 -0.643 
 (1.013) (1.595) (1.031) (3.251) (1.183) 
      
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: McCain is the baseline category. 
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Appendix Table 11: Multinomial Logit Model for 2000 Republican NH Primary 
 
 
 Bush Bauer Forbes Hatch Keyes 
      
Female 0.115 -0.122 0.171 13.613 0.291 
 (0.157) (0.727) (0.237) (795.386) (0.263) 
Age -0.064 -0.358 0.163 -0.554 -0.737*** 
 (0.146) (0.615) (0.220) (1.642) (0.234) 
Ideology 0.423*** 1.863* 0.717*** -0.668 2.361*** 
 (0.118) (1.013) (0.200) (1.528) (0.427) 
Income 0.038 -0.113 0.056 -0.640 -0.237** 
 (0.060) (0.267) (0.091) (0.790) (0.098) 
Education -0.265*** -0.461 -0.385*** 0.716 -0.263** 
 (0.078) (0.341) (0.118) (0.991) (0.130) 
Constant -0.252 -5.934* -2.452*** -16.473 -4.753*** 
 (0.511) (3.322) (0.823) (795.411) (1.366) 
      
Observations 909 909 909 909 909 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: McCain is the baseline category. 
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Appendix Table 12: Multinomial Logit Model for 1996 Republican Iowa Caucus 
 
 
 Dole Alexander Dornan Forbes Gramm Keyes Lugar Taylor No pref. 
          
Female -0.148 -0.183 14.760 -0.377** -0.076 0.233 -0.250 -0.063 0.321 
 (0.137) (0.156) (1,830.150) (0.181) (0.181) (0.203) (0.255) (0.342) (0.318) 
Age 0.496*** -0.203 14.444 -0.130 -0.292* -0.503*** 0.248 -0.089 -0.587** 
 (0.114) (0.126) (1,491.794) (0.149) (0.149) (0.166) (0.209) (0.261) (0.253) 
Ideology -1.006*** -1.690*** 13.233 -1.561*** -0.597** -0.200 -1.825*** -1.754*** -1.523*** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (1,868.597) (0.193) (0.235) (0.293) (0.232) (0.291) (0.285) 
Income 0.280*** 0.226*** -13.184 0.400*** 0.209** 0.096 0.272** -0.144 0.105 
 (0.066) (0.074) (1,009.316) (0.085) (0.086) (0.098) (0.120) (0.173) (0.151) 
Constant 1.128* 4.190*** -87.980 2.913*** 0.887 -0.019 2.121** 2.809*** 2.677*** 
 (0.604) (0.599) (7,471.419) (0.668) (0.779) (0.945) (0.850) (1.015) (0.971) 
          
Observations 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Buchanan is the baseline category. 
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Appendix Table 13: Multinomial Logit Model for 1996 Republican New Hampshire Primary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Buchanan is the baseline category. 
 
 Alexander Dole Dornan Forbes Gramm Keyes No pref. 
        
Female 0.107 0.149 0.726 0.138 0.986*** 0.263 1.345* 
 (0.168) (0.159) (0.778) (0.193) (0.333) (0.290) (0.705) 
Age 0.094 0.652*** 0.452 0.039 -0.462 0.524* 0.711 
 (0.152) (0.145) (0.647) (0.176) (0.295) (0.271) (0.583) 
Ideology -0.902*** -0.808*** -0.525 -0.577*** 1.236** -0.902*** -0.729 
 (0.150) (0.146) (0.635) (0.178) (0.591) (0.238) (0.510) 
Income 0.226*** 0.241*** -0.411 0.218*** -0.115 0.268** -0.110 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.327) (0.070) (0.128) (0.105) (0.255) 
Constant 1.061* -0.199 -2.570 -0.143 -4.918*** -1.612* -3.524 
 (0.559) (0.552) (2.470) (0.660) (1.876) (0.963) (2.161) 
        
Observations 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 
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Appendix Table 14: Multinomial Logit Model for 1996 Republican Ohio Primary 
 
 
 Dole Forbes Keyes Other 
     
Female -0.056 -0.284 0.005 0.744 
 (0.164) (0.329) (0.318) (0.543) 
Age 0.259* 0.359 -0.778*** 0.854 
 (0.143) (0.295) (0.274) (0.521) 
Ideology -0.478*** -0.654*** 0.567* -0.633* 
 (0.131) (0.234) (0.309) (0.375) 
Income -0.008 0.198 -0.081 0.617*** 
 (0.069) (0.134) (0.135) (0.222) 
Constant 1.927*** -1.140 -1.129 -5.564*** 
 (0.513) (1.002) (1.067) (1.870) 
     
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Buchanan is the baseline category. 
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